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Nature and Thought
Some Reflections on Margolis’ Claim of the Indissolubility of Realism and
Idealism
Roberto Gronda
1 Among many other things, Margolis’ new book, Pragmatism Ascendent: A Yard of Narrative,
A Touch of Prophecy, is a successful attempt to articulate in a thoroughly naturalistic way
the fundamental tenet of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy – that is, the idea that
idealism and realism are not two alternative metaphysical options, but rather two ways of
dealing with the very same thing, the concrete experience that human beings have of
their world. One of the most characteristic errors of traditional philosophies has been
that of holding apart subject and object, thus assuming either realism or idealism to be
true. In the first case, the object is treated as an entity wholly independent from the
cognitive activities of the subject; in the second case, the autonomy of the object is firmly
denied, and the object is completely absorbed in the subject. The defect of this alternative
is that it does not contemplate the possibility of a third way between these two extremes.
It was Kant who had the merit of realizing that transcendental idealism and empirical
realism not only can but also should be simultaneously embraced. Indeed, idealism refers
to the necessary relation that knowledge entertains with the subject, while empiricism
refers to the kind of validity that human knowledge possesses. So, no contradiction stems
from their simultaneous assumption. Kant explains this fundamental trait of the critical
philosophy by remarking that to say that space and time are transcendentally ideal is
only to say that they are not properties of the things-in-themselves. The recognition of
their  dependence  upon  the  cognitive  structures  of  the  agent  does  not  imply  that
judgments about space and time cannot be empirically assessed (Kant 1781/87: A369-70).
2 Margolis follows Kant in rejecting any contraposition between the subjective and the
objective. However, he considers the transcendental way that Kant has taken to be too
committed  to  rationalistic  and  dualistic  presumptions.  Accordingly,  Margolis
distinguishes between  Kant’s  constructivist  approach  –  which  represents  his  most
valuable contribution to the philosophical discourse of the ‘modernity of modernity,’ and
consists in the recognition of the fact that objects are theory-laden – and his illegitimate
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belief in the possibility of singling out a set of categories that constitute experience. The
commitment  to  a  list  of  fixed  and  unchanging  concepts  is  what  he  names
‘transcendentalism.’  Consequently,  Margolis  depicts  the  history  of  the  post-Kantian
philosophy as a series of efforts aiming at shaping a form of constructivism free from
‘transcendentalist’ prejudices. Referring to the heated debate on the nature of geometry
that characterized nineteenth century German philosophy, Margolis finds no difficulty in
showing that what Kant believed to be a necessary condition of possibility of experience –
namely, the Euclidean space – was in reality a hypothesis that was wholly legitimate at a
certain moment of history, but which was subsequently abandoned when the evolution of
physical  sciences  required  the  creation  of  new  tools  to  handle  new  problems.  On
Margolis’ reading, a correct interpretation of the history of science leads therefore to the
conclusion  that  the  categories  of  Vernunft –  the  faculty  of  reason  in  general  –  are
contingent, context-dependent, and constantly under process of revision. Far from being
the immutable structures of understanding, they are products of a transient flux whose
validity as principles of construction of experience is local and historical.
3 Plausible as this reconstruction may seem to contemporary philosophers, I  think that
some reservations should be advanced against Margolis’ treatment of the “indissoluble
union of realism and idealism” (Margolis 2012: cap 2. 54). I would like to call attention to
two different, yet interrelated points that I find particularly problematic. Firstly, I cannot
accept Margolis’  decision to restrict  the constructivist  option to the analysis of  what
Sellars  has  called  ‘the  scientific  image  of  the  world.’  Margolis  is  rather  explicit  in
maintaining that what he is dealing with is not the general concept of objectivity, but the
particular kind of objectivity that is proper of the entities postulated in science.  The
constructivism that he has in mind is therefore much less radical than one could expect:
the view that he wants to defend is the modest thesis that “what is constructed is one or
another picture of the world” (Margolis 2012: cap. 2. 12). I think that such a restriction is
not only unwarranted, but also illegitimate. In section I, I will try to show that it relies on
a conception of the nature and role of thought that seems to be not completely consistent
with the tenets of a pragmatist theory of knowledge. 
4 Secondly, I am not convinced that Margolis’s argument in favor of the rejection of the
notion of the transcendental is really conclusive. Margolis does not always distinguish
clearly between transcendental and a priori, thus implicitly assuming that the criticisms
that have been directed against the latter can be extended without modification to the
former. Now, no one can deny that in Kant’s original formulation the two notions are
essentially interwoven. Kant defines transcendental as the cognition “that is occupied […]
with our a priori concepts of objects in general” (Kant 1781/87: A11-12/B25). Similarly, it
is  not  by  chance  that  the  transcendental  deduction  of  categories  is  preceded  by  a
metaphysical  deduction  in  which  Kant  attempts  to  derive  the  different  ways  of
constructing experience from the immutable structure of understanding. So, if they are
directed against the way in which Kant defines and uses the notion of the transcendental,
Margolis’ criticisms are undoubtedly effective. But this does not mean that a different
conception cannot be developed. In section II, I will attempt to sketch the broad outlines
of  a  different  view  of  what  transcendental  philosophy  may  be  within  a  thoroughly
naturalistic  framework.  My  goal  is  to  suggest  that  the  ‘constructivist  naturalism’
endorsed by Margolis can make room for a transcendental analysis of the conditions of
possibility of scientific experience without being compelled to accept the foundationalism
that has been traditionally associated with it. 
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5 One of  the most  relevant contributions of  the book is  the reading of  the pragmatist
tradition as a particular way of coming to term with Kant’s transcendental insight. In the
context of an attempt to defend his idiosyncratic interpretation of Peirce’s concept of
fallibilism, Margolis writes:
Let me remind you once again that, as I read the matter, “idealism” (lower-case “i”)
is  either  independent  of  or  neutral  with  regard  to  “realism”  or  disjunctively
opposed  to  “realism”;  whereas  “Idealism”  (capital  “I”)  is  hospitable  to
incorporating  some  forms  of  constructive  “realism”  (as  among  the  German
Idealists).  Furthermore,  “idealism”  (in  the  Kantian  sense)  holds  that  what  is
empirically “real” is actually constituted (in part at least) by what is subjective in
origin  and  nature;  whereas  “Idealism”  (in  Peirce's  best  sense)  is  (so  to  say)
construed  “epistemologically”  (in  the  constructivist  way)  rather  than
“metaphysically”  (disjunctively),  hence  is  restricted  to  our  “picture”  (our
constructed picture) of reality rather than addressed to the actual “constitution” of
reality itself. (Margolis 2012: Chapter 2, 56)
6 The  argument  is  undoubtedly  well  grounded.  Margolis  criticizes  the  realistic
interpretation  of  Peirce’s  theory  of  truth  for  not  paying  due  attention  to  the  anti-
subjectivist  constructivism  that  is  implicit  in  the  definition that  the  founder  of
pragmatism gives of truth as the “opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all
who investigate” (Peirce 1878/1986: 273). As is well known, in How to Make Our Ideas Clear
Peirce puts forward a thesis that may seem paradoxical. He writes: “on the one hand,
reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or
any finite number of men may think about it; […] on the other hand, though the object of
the final opinion depends on what that opinion is,  yet what that opinion is does not
depend on what you or I or any man thinks” (Peirce 1878/1986: 274). The air of paradox
disappears when it is reminded that, after Kant, the structure of the object cannot be
separated  from  the  conceptual  apparatus  through  which  a  knower  understands  the
world. Consequently, the passage quoted above not only supports Margolis’ claim that
Peirce cannot be read as a pre-Kantian realist, but also allows him to conclude that a
mature, self-conscious form of realism cannot escape from a “thoroughly constructivist
account” of objectivity. 
7 The form of constructivism that Margolis wants to defend has two distinctive features.
Firstly,  it  is  radically  anti-subjectivist,  where  by  ‘subjectivism’  Margolis  means  two
different things: on the one hand, the unilateral and excessive emphasis on the creative
power of the self to the detriment of the legitimate rights of the object; on the other
hand, the idea that the categories of understanding are a priori fixed features of the
human mind. Secondly,  it  is  intended to hold only for the refined pictures of reality
generated by sciences. For these reasons, his version of constructivism is less ambitious
than Kant’s original one. Indeed, it does not pretend to provide a general account of
objectivity,  but  only  to  clarify  the  main  aspects  of  the  process  of  ‘epistemological’
constitution  of  scientific  entities.  Similarly,  it  does  not  accept  Kant’s  idea  that  a
satisfactory account of  objectivity depends upon the discovery of a list  of  immutable
categories  from which  to  derive  the  ways  in  which  a  mind  imposes  transcendental
constraints on everything that can count as an object of experience. The conception of a
liberalized ‘a priori’ is the horizon within which Margolis formulates his rejection of the
notion of transcendental necessity (Margolis 2012: Chapter 2, 31). Following the footsteps
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of  Hegel,  Margolis  argues that  the very idea of  a  transcendental  necessity should be
replaced with a more empirical view according to which the categories of understanding
are “continually relativized to the habituated practices of a given ethos” (Margolis 2012:
Chapter 1, 40). 
8 This is,  I  think, the sense of Margolis’  long statement quoted at the beginning of the
present section, in which the reasons of his dissatisfaction with Kant’s transcendental
project are clearly expressed. By contrasting Kant’s idealism with post-Kantian Idealism,
Margolis  aims  at  calling  attention  to  Kant’s  unwarranted  assumption  that  the
‘subjectivist’ identity of idealism and realism entails the “ontic construction of the whole
of ‘reality’ itself” (Margolis 2012: Chapter 1, 47; see also Margolis 2010: 100-11). This move
is  probably  due  to  his  fear  of  laying  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  metaphysical
constructivism. But is it truly so? Is Margolis entitled to draw such a conclusion from the
remark that “‘idealism’ (in the Kantian sense) holds that what is  empirically ‘real’  is
actually constituted (in part at least) by what is subjective in origin and nature”? To state
it more clearly, is Margolis right in believing that the ‘subjectivity of the categories of
understanding’ is intimately connected to the possibility of accounting for reality – the
empirically real – as a construction, and that such an extension of the constructivist
paradigm implies an idealistic ontology? Isn’t it possible to take a step back and to see
these two aspects – transcendentalism and constructivism – as responding to different
problems that Kant unfortunately attempts to merge together? I will try to argue for the
latter  position  in  the  following  way.  First  of  all,  I  will  show that,  contrary  to  what
Margolis seems to believe, the notion of constructivism is metaphysically unproblematic.
Then, I will focus attention on the general philosophical consequences that follows from
the recognition of this fact. Finally, I will spend a few words to explain why I believe that
a thorough naturalism cannot make the distinction between the empirically real and the
scientific pictures of the world. 
9 Constructivism is usually defined as that epistemological position which emphasizes the
role of mind in the construction of known reality (Parrini 2006: 2374, see also Margolis
2012: Chapter 1, 46). The origins of this view can be traced back to Vico and Hobbes, but
its most influential  version has been formulated by Kant.  In a central passage of the
second-edition  Transcendental  Deduction  Kant  writes:  “An  object  […]  is  that  in  the
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (Kant 1781/87: B137). On this
view  –  which  Margolis  correctly  conceives  of  as  the  most  important  theoretical
achievement of modern philosophy – the identity of object and concept, subjective and
objective, realism and idealism, is explicitly stated. Reality and our understanding of it
convertuntur since the unity of the object is nothing but the unity of its correspondent
concept.  Unfortunately,  Kant’s  dualism  prevents  him  from  developing  a  consistent
idealism. In this sense, the history of post-Kantian philosophy from Fichte to C. I. Lewis
can be profitably depicted as a series of attempts to overcome the dichotomy of sense and
understanding,  a  posteriori  and  a  priori,  synthetic  and  analytic.  However,  in  the
Transcendental  Schematism  Kant  provides  the  conceptual  means  to  extend  his
constructivist insight to hold for every kind of object. Indeed, here Kant maintains that
the schema of sensible concepts and the schema of a pure concept of understanding share
the same fundamental structure: the schema of a concept – no matter whether pure or
empirical – “signifies a rule of the synthesis of imagination” in accordance with that
general concept (Kant 1781/87: A141/B180). But this means that constructivism can be
separated without loss from the ‘transcendentalist’ and ‘subjectivist’ hypothesis of the
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fixed nature of the categories of human understanding. The intelligibility of an object is
the  result  of  its  being  constructed according to  an universal  rule:  this  is  the  whole
meaning  of  a  mature  constructivist  position.  Its  core  is  the  functional  account  of
objectivity. Object is everything that can be constructed in accordance with a concept.
Consequently, both the objects of common sense – what Margolis calls the ‘empirically
real’ – and the postulated entities of science are constructs. Indeed, not only the entities
postulated  in  sciences,  but  also  the  objects  encountered  and  used  in  our  everyday
transactions  with  the  environment  possess  a  degree  of  intelligibility  that  makes  it
possible for a knowing agent to understand their behavior in the context of a purposeful
activity. 
10 In the light of what has been said until now, it should be easier to see why a constructivist
approach to the issue of objectivity should be considered metaphysically unproblematic.
Indeed, what is constructed is not the existence of an object but its meaning. Reality and
concept  are  semantic notions,  and the  idealism that  stems from the  adoption of  the
constructivist viewpoint – pace Margolis – is a critical idealism that inquires into the
conditions of possibility of the meaningfulness of the human world. It is very likely that
Margolis’  reservations are due at least in part to his almost exclusive interest in the
problem  of  truth,  which  obviously  entails  the  problem  of  the  relationship  between
thought and reality.  However, no one better than a pragmatist should appreciate the
importance  of  this  shift  from  existence  and  truth  to  meaning.  In  the  end,  Peirce’s
pragmatic maxim is nothing but a refined way of formulating the semantic identity of
object  and  concept  –  the  mediating  element  being  the  much  discussed  notion  of
conceivable practical bearings. So, it is rather surprising that Margolis does not see that
the semantic thesis that human beings construct their objects in conformity to the rules
involved in their concepts does not seem to support the metaphysical conclusion that
human beings constitute what is empirically real. 
11 What is even more surprising is that, in order to reject the metaphysical interpretation of
constructivism, Margolis contrasts the real world with our pictures of it. In an extremely
obscure  passage  Margolis  writes:  “Nothing […]  requires  that  the  real  world  must  be
constructed by human agents: what is constructed is one or another picture of the world”
(Margolis 2012: Chapter 2, 12). I must admit I find hard to locate the source of Margolis’
difficulties. However, this excerpt seems to me to be surprising because the distinction
that Margolis introduces seems to presuppose the distinctions between subjective and
objective he wants to criticize. This point can be highlighted by reflecting upon a passage
drawn by Kant’s Jäsche Logic. Writing about the difference between form and matter in
cognition, Kant remarks: 
If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not
acquainted,  he  admittedly  has  before  him  in  his  representation  the  very  same
object  as  someone  else  who  is  acquainted  with  it  determinately  as  a  dwelling
established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is
different in the two. With the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition
and concept at the same time. (Kant 1992: 544-55)
12 In the context of an analysis of the empirical differences generated by the possession of a
concept, the statement is perfectly correct. But if it is taken to mean something more
than that – and Margolis seems to be willing to draw relevant conclusions from it –, it
becomes malicious. In Kant’s argument, the epistemic access to a meaningful world is
presupposed as an implicit premise. On the contrary, Margolis’ distinction between the
real  world  and  its  scientific  images  seems  to  question  precisely  the  validity  of  this
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premise. If I understand him aright, Margolis is saying here two different things: a) that
all  the  pictures  that  have  been  constructed  in  the  history  of  science  refer  to  an
underlying reality of which they are all pictures; and b) that the real world has a kind of
intelligibility that is not the one proper of the object of sciences. 
13 But  what  is  ‘the  real  world’?  In  my opinion,  the only  answer that  does  not  commit
Margolis  to  an  untenable  and  contradictory  metaphysical  dualism  is  the  one  that
identifies the real world with the world of common sense.  Besides,  the very contrast
between real world and scientific images makes sense if and only if the real world does
not  lie  beyond the  scope of  our  experience.  Copernican and Ptolemaic  theories  give
radically different representations of the astronomical reality, but their common ground
is the man that looks at the sky and sees the rhythm of day and night. As Dewey puts in
the opening chapter of Experience and Nature, the world of common sense, the world that
the human beings inhabit, is the pillar to which “the vine of pendant theory is attached”
(Dewey 1929/81: 11). 
14 However, if the real world is taken to be the world of common sense rather than an
unknowable  thing  in  itself,  Margolis’  restriction  of  the  constructivist  explanation  of
meaning to the account of the entities of science loses great part of its force. To say that
the objects of common sense are not constructed but given would entail the admission of
a  source  of  meaning  and  objectivity  that  cannot  be  explained  in  experimental  and
naturalistic terms. Indeed, one of the great theoretical advantages of the adoption of a
constructivist point of view is that it allows us to provide a simple, yet comprehensive
account of the processes through which a human being succeeds in creating a meaningful
and  ordered  world.  Meanings  are  traced  back  to  the  acts  of  an  organism  bringing
together means and ends, stimuli and responses, as a consequence of which the latter can
be read into the former (Dewey 1896/1972: 98). This, for instance, is the way in which
Dewey explains the constitution of the moral world out of morally meaningless impulses
in the pages of Human Nature and Conduct. 
15 For a pragmatist, meaning is the act of anticipating the consequences of a certain event,
and the fact that objects have a meaning is the condition of possibility of there being a
world. The world of common sense is therefore the world structured by the habits of
behavior an agent has acquired in the course of his prior experience and education. The
objects of common sense are nothing but settled ways of responding to the standard
stimuli presented by the environment. This is the sense of Dewey’s otherwise puzzling
remark that objects are “habits turned inside out” (Dewey 1922/83: 127). But this means
that the real world is constructed in the same way – and in the very same sense – in
which the postulated entities of science are constructed: that is, by singling out those
elements that can be used as reliable signs of future possible consequences. 
⁂
16 From what has been said above it follows that classical pragmatists – notably, Dewey, but
the same holds true for James – believe constructivism to be the only theory of meaning 
compatible with a thorough naturalism. In recent times,  many scholars have tried to
recover the genuine constructivist spirit of pragmatism. However, in order to outline the
main features of a neo-pragmatist and post-analytic account of objectivity,  they have
unfortunately  relied  on  the  language  of  transcendental  philosophy.  So,  for  instance,
Pihlström  has  maintained  that  pragmatism  is  “the  key  to  the  naturalization  of
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transcendental conditions,” where by ‘transcendental conditions’ he means the social,
cultural  and historical  constraints that are imposed on us as people of  a certain age
(Pihlström 2001: 230). On this reading, human beings agree in a form of life: its general
structures define the “(quasi-) transcendental conditions” that determine how its members
should think and act (Pihlström 2001: 230). 
17 Even though this lax use of ‘transcendental’ is now widely accepted, I agree with Margolis
that the identification of constructivism with transcendentalism is misleading. As has
already been remarked above, constructivism is an extremely general theory revolving
around the idea of the essential interwovenness of the subjective and the objective, while
transcendental philosophy is only one of the possible forms in which the constructivist
insight can be articulated. This remark is particularly relevant for our purposes since, as
Margolis has pointed out, the history of pragmatism cannot be properly understood if
this distinction is not borne in mind. Pragmatism is an ambitious attempt to continue
Hegel’s (and Kant’s) project “along naturalistic and post-Darwinian lines” (Margolis 2012:
Chapter 1, 36). For this reason, I think that Pihlström is wrong in interpreting the habits
of  action  that  structure  our  common-sense  knowledge  of  the  world  as  (quasi-
)transcendental rules of construction of reality. Undoubtedly, the habits of action are the
naturalistic counterparts of the Kantian categories of understanding: they are a priori
rules of constitution of objectivity whose validity can be accounted for in terms of their
effectiveness  in  construing  an  ordered  and  intelligible  world.  But  they  are  not
transcendental  because  the  naturalization  of  the  Kantian  a  priori  dramatically
undermines the theoretical framework that makes it possible to speak in a meaningful
way of transcendental conditions for our having a world in view. 
18 This point can be highlighted with an example. In a certain sense, it is possible to argue
that the fact of having a brain with a particular structure should be conceived of as one of
these  (quasi-)transcendental  conditions.  Indeed,  if  our  brain  were  different,  our
experience would not be possible – or, at least, it would be markedly different. This is a
formally valid transcendental argument since it states a necessary relationship between
the protasis and the apodosis, Now, a ‘transcendental’ argument so constructed seems to
be  a  reductio  ad  absurdum of  the  whole  theory  rather  than  a  step  towards  the
naturalization  of  transcendental  philosophy.  Obviously,  a  defender  of  transcendental
arguments would remind us that the kind of necessity holding between the protasis and
the  apodosis  is  not  empirical,  but  metaphysical.  It  is  taken  to  express  “certain
metaphysical constraints that can be established by reflection,” and that hold in every
possible world (Stern 1999: 3). However, such a move is not open to a pragmatist. Since he
is both a thorough naturalist and a radical constructivist, he cannot admit either the idea
of  a  metaphysical  constraint  or  the  distinction  between  reflection  and  empirical
observation. Every habit of behavior is a natural event, a particular way in which the
biological  nature  of  a  human  being  realizes  itself.  Accordingly,  the  necessity  that
characterizes  the structuring conditions of  our experience is  not  metaphysically,  but
functionally and historically a priori: it is the necessity of a rule that prescribes a certain
course of action to an agent, and whose provisional validity is a consequence of its having
proved itself to be efficient as a norm of conduct. 
19 I  think that  Margolis  is  completely right on this  point:  the adoption of  a  relativized
conception of the a priori compels us to accept the radical view that reason is going to
become  “increasingly  fragmentary,  parochial,  fluxive,  historicized”  because  of  the
increasing complexity of the world with which human beings interact (Margolis 2012:
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Chapter  1,  44).  In  my  view,  this  is  the  essential  core  of  a  consistent  constructivist
naturalism. However, this does not mean that the notion of transcendental should be cast
aside as a completely useless tool. Margolis’ rejection of it seems to me a little bit too
rash. If we pay attention to the way in which Kant defines this concept, we notice that
‘transcendental’ does not refer to our objects, but only to our knowledge of these objects
insofar as this is possible a priori (Kant 1781/87: A 11-12/B 25). This remark gives us a
clue about how to develop a plausible conception of transcendental philosophy which
could be incorporated within a thoroughly naturalistic framework.
20 Since it is not possible to discuss in detail all the various issues involved in this way of
conceiving transcendental philosophy, I will limit myself to sketch its general outlines. It
has been noted above that transcendental is not a property of a set of concepts, but a
possible attitude that an agent may take regarding the nature and validity of the a priori
conditions of experience. The structure of the sui generis logical space of transcendental
reflections is not different in principle to that of the most advanced sciences: indeed, the
methods and procedures used to confirm or reject an assertion are the same through and
through. This is, I think, the cash value of Margolis’ thesis of the “inseparability of our
first-  and  second-order  questions”  (Margolis  2012:  Chapter  1,  11).  The  questions
concerning  our  knowledge  of  the  world  are  methodologically  continuous  with  the
questions concerning our knowledge of knowledge. But this does not imply that the aim
of the transcendental attitude is to provide a general theory of objectivity. This is the
ultimate  reason  why  I  believe  that  it  is  important  to  keep  constructivism  and
transcendental  philosophy separated.  The aim of  a  transcendental approach is  much
more modest  than that:  it  is  to provide a general  account of  what it  means to be a
scientific picture of reality. Transcendental reflection takes the results of natural sciences
as given, and inquires into the conditions of possibility of these practices of knowledge.
From Kant’s transcendental standpoint, the problem is that of finding a metaphysical
warrant for the objective validity of the categories. From a naturalistic perspective, the
search  for  such  a  warrant  is  meaningless  because  scientific  concepts  are  historical
products. Again, Margolis is right in saying that “the contingency of our first-ordered
answers ineluctably infects the conditions of validity of all answers to our second-order
questions” (Margolis 2012: Chapter 1, 11).
21 But if this is true, what is the function performed by transcendental reflection? I think
that  its  function  is  to  formulate  testable  hypotheses  about  the  nature  of  rationality,
which can be used as basis for future scientific inquiries. Even though they both are ways
of constructing a meaningful world, common sense and science differ in their complexity.
The processes that constitute scientific entities are controlled and self-critical, while the
biological  activities  that  constitute  everyday  objects  are  largely  imprecise  and
incomplete. They are incomplete because common-sense concepts are undetermined with
regard to many of the properties of their correspondent objects. This is a consequence of
the  fact  that  our  everyday  transactions  with  the  world  do  not  require  the  kind  of
precision needed in modern scientific experiments. The concept of water enables us to
forecast the behavior of that object in standard conditions, but it does not say anything
about its possible behavior in exceptional circumstances: water is what can be used to
drink and wash clothes  (Dewey 1929/84:  126ff.).  At  the very same time,  the relative
simplicity  of  the  transactions  constituting  everyday  objects  guarantees  the  relative
stability of the world of common sense. On the contrary, scientific objects are defined
intra-theoretically: so, the meaning of water varies according to the different scientific
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frameworks  used  to  interpret  it.  Now,  it  is  of  the  nature  of  scientific  objects  to  be
subjected  to  a  continuous  process  of  refinement,  with  the  aim  to  increase  their
explanatory power. This process of revision can be guided by a regulative idea of what
human beings, at a certain time in history, consider a satisfactory conception of reason,
meaning, and objectivity. Traditionally, this idea has taken the form of a unified theory of
rationality.  My suggestion is  that  the goal  of  transcendental  refection is  precisely to
impose some constraints of this sort on the way in which a scientific theory should be
made. Obviously, all these constraints are only provisional and tentative. Nonetheless,
they are not arbitrary. They are justified, retrospectively, by their being attuned to the
most advanced scientific and technical  knowledge of the time,  and,  prospectively,  by
their  being  expression  of  the  cognitive  needs  and  desires  of  (some)  members  of  a
scientific community. This constructivist conception of the transcendental is genuinely
naturalistic, so that a pragmatist should not feel uncomfortable with it even though it
sets itself to counterbalance the dissolution of the unity of reason determined by the
relativization of the Kantian a priori. On this reading, transcendental philosophy is one of
the tools that human beings have created in the long course of their history in order to
enhance the understanding of reality (Preti 1973: 149ff.). There is no legitimate reason
not to exploit it apart from the empirical assessment of its uselessness.
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